

Course Syllabus
8,359 Fundamentals of Arms Control
Spring Semester 2023

Prof. James W. Davis, Ph.D.
Institute of Political Science
Müller-Friedberg-Strasse 6

Email: James.Davis@unisg.ch

Teaching Assistant: Konstantin Schendzielorz (Konstantin.Schendzielorz@unisg.ch)

Office Hours: By appointment via Annekristine.Tischhauser@unisg.ch

During the second half of the 20th Century, arms control was central to the strategies of the superpowers to enhance their security and promote international stability. But developments in the 21st Century suggest that the commitment of the nuclear superpowers and emerging great powers to the project of arms control has weakened. Meanwhile important voices from the realm of diplomatic practice have provoked a renewed debate about the wisdom of disarmament.

This course is intended to introduce students in the MIA program to the fundamental concepts, theories, and strategies for achieving arms control among rival states under conditions of international anarchy. Emphasis will be placed on the intellectual underpinnings of arms control as a strategy for promoting states' security.

The central thesis is that arms control is not an end in and of itself, but rather a means toward preventing the outbreak of war. Students will gain a basic familiarity with the modern history of both conventional and nuclear arms control as well as contemporary challenges driven by political and technological developments.

Learning objectives:

Students will master the fundamental concepts and processes of states' efforts to control conventional and nuclear weapons as well as the modern history of arms control.

Students will improve their analytic skills through oral presentations and an original written essay.

Course structure:

This master's level seminar meets on a weekly basis. Because this is not a lecture class, the success or failure of the course will depend to a great extent on students' degree of participation. Students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the week's readings, which to the extent possible will be made available on Canvas. Each student will be responsible for presenting the readings for one session.

Students will also write a paper on a topic of their choosing.

Attendance:

Attendance in this course is mandatory. There are a few exceptions that qualify for an excused student absence from in-person participation. These are a requirement to quarantine due to COVID-19

exposure, illness or a health emergency accompanied by relevant documentation, death of an immediate family member, and documented disabilities. If you are requesting one of these exceptions, students must notify the teaching assistant Konstantin Schendzielorz outlining the reason for the absence, and with accompanying documentation where relevant.

Grading:

40% of the final grade will reflect the instructor's assessment of the in-class presentation of the week's readings. 60% of the final grade will reflect the instructor's assessment of the term paper.

Class Presentation:

Students (either individually or in small groups depending on enrolment) will present the readings for one week. A good presentation will start off with an overview of the basic issue or set of questions addressed by the week's readings followed by the main arguments of the authors. The presenters will then be expected to guide a class discussion that critically engages with the authors' arguments and evidence. This usually requires confronting the seminar participants with relevant debates and questions covered by the readings and/or extensions to contemporary developments.

Paper:

Each student will write a research paper on no more than 5,000 words. Most papers will take a topic covered in the seminar as a starting point and develop an argument that is theoretically coherent and evaluated against empirical data.

Although no two papers look alike, most will comprise the following elements:

1. Introduction

A good paper is directed toward answering a question or analysing a puzzle, and a good introduction tells your reader what the paper is about and how your argument will develop.

- (a) What is the question?
- (b) Why is it important?
- (c) What is your answer or thesis?
- (d) What is your theoretical approach and what methods will you use?
- (e) What empirical cases or data sets will you use to answer your question or support your thesis?
- (f) Roadmap of the paper.

2. Literature review

A good paper addresses a gap in understanding (your own or the field's as a whole). You need to tell the reader why your paper is important.

- (a) Is there a scholarly literature or debate on the question?
- (b) Does your paper address an important policy question?

3. Theory & Methods

- (a) How did you develop your thesis? Or, where have you derived the hypotheses you plan to test?
- (b) Are there alternative theories that you plan to test?

(c) How will you bring data to bear on your thesis/hypotheses? What methods are appropriate (single case study, comparative case study, large-n quantitative analysis, experiment)?

4. Empirical Analysis

In this section you present your data and assess the degree to which it fits your theory/thesis or confirms/refutes your hypotheses.

5. Conclusion

(a) Summary of results

(b) Broader implications for theory and/or policy & practice

A good paper begins with an important question or puzzle. For example: Does arms control promote crisis stability? Based on a survey of relevant arguments, authors should make a claim. For example: Arms control promotes security by limiting the offensive capabilities of the parties to the treaty. This thesis should then be explored with reference to historical data, perhaps an in-depth case study from the Cold War or a comparison of cases over a longer period. Good papers will contain a serious discussion of the most important alternative explanations and suggest why the evidence fits their argument better. In presenting conclusions, the author will point out their relevance for our broader understanding of international security.

Articles published in the leading journals in security studies, *International Security*, *Security Studies*, and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* can serve as models of best practice.

Students are free to use any recognized citation format in a precise and consistent fashion although the instructor has a slight preference for the Chicago Style.

Seminar Schedule and Readings

Session 1: 22 Feb. 2023 **Kickoff / Organizational Matters**

Session 2: 01 March 2023 **Basic Concepts & Current Situation**

John D. Maurer, "The Purposes of Arms Control," *Texas National Security Review* 2, 1 (November 2018), pp. 9-27.

Jon Brooks Wolfsthal, "Why Arms Control?" *Daedalus* 149, 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 101-115.

Linton F. Brooks, "The End of Arms Control?" *Daedalus* 149, 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 84-100.

Session 3: 08 March 2023 **Anarchy Problematique**

Robert Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapter 3.

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, 2 (January 1978), pp. 67-214, 1978.

Kenneth Oye. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38, 1 (October 1985), pp. 1-24.

Session 4: 15 March 2023 The Problem of Crisis Instability

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Chapters 6, 7.

Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), chapter 9.

Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability and Causes of War," *Daedalus* 120, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 167-181; or the version under the same title found in *Political Science Quarterly* 108, 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.

Session 5: 22 March 2023 The Theory of Arms Control

Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, "Strategy and Arms Control" (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), Chapters 1-3.

Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order" *International Security* 1,1 (Summer 1976), pp. 3 - 16.

Session 6: 29 March 2023 Critique on the Theory of Arms Control

Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs* 64, 2 (Winter 1986/86), pp. 214-233.

Marc Trachtenberg, "The Past and Future of Arms Control," *Daedalus* 120, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 203-216.

Session 7: 19 April 2023 Bargaining Tactics & Technical Issues

Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman, *Coercion, NOMOS, XIV* (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), pp. 272-288.

William D. Jackson, "Verification in Arms Control: Beyond NTM," *Journal of Peace Research* 19 4 (1982), pp. 345-353

Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, "From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance," *International Security* 14, 4 (Spring, 1990), pp. 147-164

Session 8: 26 April 2023 SALT & INF

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT I): <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-arms-limitation-talks-salt-i-salt-ii/>

ABM Treaty: <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-limitation-anti-ballistic-missile-systems-abm-treaty/>

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Treats (SALTII): <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-arms-limitation-talks-salt-ii/>

INF Treaty: <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-union-of-soviet-socialist-republics-on-the-elimination-of-their-intermediate-range-and-shorter-range-missiles/>

Raymond L. Garthoff, "Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3,1 (Summer 1978), pp. 112 – 147

Marc Trachtenberg, "The United States and Strategic Arms Limitation during the Nixon-Kissinger Period," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 24,4 (December 2022), pp. 157-197.

Robert Jervis, "The Many Faces of SALT," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 24,4 (December 2022), pp. 198-214.

Session 9: 3 May 2023 CFE and Conventional Arms Control in Europe

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/>

Barry R. Posen, Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control, *Daedalus* 120, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 217-232.

Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1996), chapters 4-6.

Session 10: 10 May 2023 START & New START

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START I): <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-i-start-ii/>

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START II): <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-ii/>

New START Treaty: <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-russian-federation-on-measures-for-the-further-reduction-and-limitation-of-strategic-offensive-arms/>

Rose Gottemoeller, "Negotiating the New START Treaty", Cambria Press, 2021; available at Stanford Bookstore (hardcopy) or from <http://www.cambriapress.com/NewSTART>

(electronic version). Prologue and Chapter 1, "Framing the New START Treaty" and Chapter 5, "October Breakthrough on Verification."

Rose Gottemoeller, "The Case Against a New Arms Race. Nuclear Weapons Are Not the Future", *Foreign Affairs* (August 2019), URL: [The Case Against a New Arms Race: Nuclear Weapons Are Not the Future \(foreignaffairs.com\)](https://www.foreignaffairs.com)

Heather A. Conley, Vladimir Orlov, Gen. Evgeny Buzhinsky, Cyrus Newlin, Sergey Semenov, Roksana Gabidullina, "The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Principles of Engagement and New Approaches," (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2021). Available Online at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-us-russian-arms-control-principles-engagement-and-new-approaches>

Session 11: 17 May 2023 Nuclear Disarmament: Old Debates & New Concepts

George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *The Wall Street Journal* (January 4, 2007).

Josef Joffe, and James W. Davis, "Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble," *Foreign Affairs* 90, 1 (January/ February 2011), pp. 7-15.

Bruce Blair, Matt Brown, Richard Burt, Josef Joffe, and James W. Davis, "Can Disarmament Work? Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Weapons" *Foreign Affairs* 90, 4 (Jul/Aug 2011), pp. 173-178.

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument," *International Security* 37, 2 (Winter 2021/13), pp. 92-132.

Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, "Nuclear Disarmament without Nuclear Weapons States: The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty," *Daedalus* 149, 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 171-189.

Session 12: 24 May 2023 Emerging issues

James M. Acton, "Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation," *Daedalus* 149, 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 133-149.

Caitlin Talmadge, "Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era," in: Vipin Narang; Scott D. Sagan, "*The Fragile Balance of Terror. Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age*," Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, pp. 13 – 38

Vipin Narang; Scott D. Sagan, "Conclusion: The Dangerous Nuclear Future," in: Vipin Narang; Scott D. Sagan, "*The Fragile Balance of Terror. Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age*," Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, pp. 230 – 250

Hersman, Rebecca K.C.; Williams, Heather; Claeys, Suzanne (2022): "Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic Competition," A Report of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Rowman & Littlefield, New York