In introduction, the EU recalled its support for the Hague Code of Conduct and its objective to promote the universalisation of the Code, an instrument made all the more relevant by the change of circumstances.

The outgoing Chair and incoming Chair shared perspectives on their role and the way to promote the HCoC today. It was noted that the Code is a technical instrument and that states should refrain from bringing political considerations to the table. Twenty years after its adoption, the HCoC is a fundamental multilateral instrument aiming at preventing proliferation and bringing confidence among states. With ongoing developments linked to missile acquisition and testing in many regions of the globe, it is very relevant. It plays a key role in reducing risks of misperception and uncontrolled escalation. It therefore has a special mission in the broader disarmament and non-proliferation environment.

The first presentation had two parts. First, the speaker identified the main trends in missile development in Asia. A focus was put on China, which is developing a large number of SRBMs and MRBMs apparently in the event of a conflict over Taiwan and to dissuade a possible US intervention. Beijing also invests in asymmetric missile capacities and is reportedly building up its ICBM forces in a deterrence perspective. These developments may lead other regional powers to develop missile programmes, for instance Japan, which is pursuing limited counterattack capacities and is thinking about the acquisition of hypersonic missiles for the protection of its remote islands. Taiwan focuses on missile defence but may also acquire land-attack cruise missiles and ATACMS aero-ballistic missiles from the US. Finally, South Korea actively develops short-range systems to counter the North Korean nuclear threat, with increased capacities (range and payloads).

In a second part, the expert presented practices and technologies used to track the North Korean missile programmes. The DPRK’s missile arsenal is being developed according to several priorities, from strategic deterrence against the US to theatre convention and nuclear war. A first reference to the DPRK’s missile tests is the official releases from South Korea and Japan Defence Ministries, but also the statements from North Korea which can provide important information. The observation of photos provided by the North Korean authorities allows to infer many indications on systems, from propulsion to thrust and performance. The use of satellite imagery allows for precise measurement and deduction on the size of systems.

The second presenter highlighted the various technological developments that are challenging the regulatory framework connected to missiles, and in particular the MTCR. The involvement of new actors is also an important factor, new states and non-state actors acquiring missile capacities, but also private actors developing satellite launching capacities, which in theory could create new proliferation pathways.

The case of Iran was developed, with several preoccupying factors. First, Iran is involved in the dissemination of missile technologies to a non-state actor involved in missile attacks, the Houthis. Second, the IRGC are officially developing a space programme which could clearly pave the way to a long range missile, should Iran choose so. Solid rocket motor built for space application could also be used in the development of hypersonic missiles. The development of hypersonic systems is a clear concern. On the one hand, aero-ballistic missiles are used on the ground, such as the Russian Kinzhal. On the other, countries such as China have developed actual hypersonic gliders, whose design might be copied by other states and in particular the DPRK. These systems can be destabilizing in particular because of their flight speed.

The third presenter focused on the evolutions in the space sector that may have an impact on the missile landscape in the future. It was assessed that the HCoC fully recognises the duality of the space sector. But the evolutions in the sector may increase this linkage between missile and launcher technologies. Thus, in the last ten years, the number of launches has been multiplied by almost three, the number of satellites launched by 24. Four new states are launching satellites, and 62 new states have assets in space. The use in particular of small satellites has led to the development of various projects of micro-launchers, which are often developed by private corporations, in the United States, in Europe, but also in Asia. Other trends may be durable or not, such as the use of air-launch systems, the concept of responsible launch, or the ambition to provide point-to-point transportation. If these trends raise questions on the accessibility of launching technologies for military applications, they can also create opportunities for monitoring and tracking missile programmes.

Finally, the last presentation focused on the resilience of regulatory frameworks to the evolutions in the field of missiles. These evolutions show the growth of the number of countries that possess ballistic missiles, even if many of these programmes are not connected to WMDs in any way and a growing number of countries focus on the acquisition of missiles as conventional weapons. Historically, arms control has been a key tool to limit the growth of missile arsenals. But the deterioration of the geopolitical context, as well as strategic evolutions, means that it is increasingly difficult to negotiate legally binding agreements in this field between major powers. Export control mechanisms have been important tools to limit the dissemination of missile technologies, but they suffer from the lack of relevance of their technical criteria, and from the fact that they are not universal. Also, as states develop their own production capacities, they are no longer constrained by restrictions on exports. The same is true for specific multilateral mechanisms aiming at preventing certain actors from developing missiles. The 1540 resolution targets non-state actors. UNSC resolutions focus on North Korea and Iran and may seem less effective as these countries are becoming able to produce domestically sophisticated technologies. Finally, CBMs, and in particular notification regimes, will face limitations, such as the lack of participation by key actors, the restrictive nature of the systems concerned and the fact that as missiles are increasingly used in conflict as conventional weapons, the concept of pre-notification and transparency loses some relevance. Nonetheless, they are bound to continue to play a role to limit some misunderstanding and uncontrolled escalation linked to the development of these systems.