Missile Proliferation and the Middle East: Ways Forward
30-31 January
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
In January 2024, the Foundation for Strategic Research and the B’huth co-organised a seminar in Dubai (UAE) to engage with representatives from 10 countries and key actors from the region. This is part of a series of seminars organised all over the globe by the Foundation to spread awareness on the role of the Hague Code of Conduct with the support of the European Union.
AGENDA
DAY 1
INTRODUCTION
- Mr Mohammed Adbul Rahman Baharoon, Director General, B’huth
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
I/ Missile Dissemination in the Middle East: Trends and Dynamics
MODERATOR:
- Mr Mohammed Adbul Rahman Baharoon, Director General, B’huth
PANELLISTS:
- Mr Fabian Hinz, Research Fellow, IISS
- Dr Dania Thafer, Executive Director, Gulf International Forum
- Dr Ebtesam Alketbi, President, Emirate Policy Center
KEY ISSUES:
- Focus on missile proliferation drivers and dynamics in the Middle East: the state of play
- The role of non-state actors in missile uses in the Middle East
- Missile defence: current efforts and impact on regional security
II/ From arms control to non-proliferation: what tools to control the spread of missiles in the region?
MODERATOR:
- Dr Riad Kahwaji, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, INEGMA
PANELLISTS:
- Dr Mohammed Al Dhaheri, Deputy Director General, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy
- Shaikha Najla Mohamed Salem Al Qasimi, Director Global Affairs Department, B’huth
- Dr Hesham Alghannam, Advisor, Director General of the Security Research Center at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS)
KEY ISSUES:
- Regulating missiles in the Middle East through arms control: historical propositions and perspectives
- Transparency measures and confidence-building measures: what benefits at the regional level?
- Perspectives
III/ The Hague Code of Conduct: a Tool to Limit the risk posed by missiles in the Middle East?
MODERATOR:
- Ms Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow, FRS
PANELLISTS:
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
- Amb. Eoin O’Leary, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the International Organisations in Vienna, HCoC Chair, 2023-2024
- Mr George-Wilhem Gallhofer, Head of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation/Executive Secretariat of the Hague Code of Conduct at the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs
KEY ISSUES:
- Objectives and Limitations of the Code
- Benefits of subscribing to the code
- Day-to-day functioning of the HCoC
DAY 2
IV/ Missiles and Space Launchers: Evolutions and Revolutions
MODERATOR:
- Shaikha Najla Mohamed Salem Al Qasimi, Director Global Affairs Department, B’huth
PANELLISTS:
- Assoc. Prof. Sitki Egeli, Associate Professor, Izmir University of Economics
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
KEY ISSUES:
- Differences and Commonalities between missile and rocket technologies
- Space Evolution and Impact on Missile Proliferation
V/ Regulating Proliferation while Enabling Space Development
MODERATOR:
- Dr Hasan Alhasan, Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy, IISS, Bahrain
PANELLISTS:
- Dr John Sheldon, Partner, AzurX, Dubai
- Florence Gaillard-Sborowsky (online)
KEY ISSUES:
- Space Developments in the Middle East and priorities
- Transparency and norms to promote the peaceful use of space: what role for CBMs?
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Video content and pictures are the courtesy of the B’huth.
Summary of the debates
Missile Dissemination in the Middle East: Trends and Dynamics
The first session was opened by a technical assessment of the drivers and motivations for missile acquisition in the Middle East. Specifically, a shift was identified during the 2000s, which saw the move from a context in which it was difficult to produce or procure ballistic missiles to one in which new technologies development mean that ballistic missiles are much more accurate and can be obtained much more easily. Under these conditions, missiles have spread in the region and are operated in almost all countries by some government, but mostly non-state actors.
This assessment was followed by a look into the impact of ballistic missiles on regional security. It was recalled that the level of use of ballistic missiles since 2015 has been unprecedented, with at least 162 missiles intercepted between 2015-2022. Despite regular interception, ballistic missiles remain destabilising for a number of reasons, ranging from their psychological effect to the difficulty of striking preemptively on mobile and hidden launchers. When used by non-state actors, they provide them with military advantage and act as a propaganda tool that may elevate tensions to regional level.
This analysis was shared by the last speaker on the panel, who emphasised the global reach of recent attacks.
It was noted during the discussion that the perception of the missile threat differs between Europe and the Middle East. This gap, as well as differences of conception and use of missiles between the regions, fails to be recognised by regulatory systems. Finally, the benefits of cooperation in developing strategies was highlighted.
From arms control to non-proliferation: what tools to control the spread of missiles in the region?
The panel opened by remarks that Iran-backed NSAs are the only operators using ballistic missiles in the region, and the technology transfers from Iran have been documented. Regarding arms control in the region, it is therefore a priority to limit weapon transfers from Iran to various non-state actors.
Several points were underlined by the speakers. It was noted that only a comprehensive framework could lead to effective arms control in the Middle East, taking into account political, military, technological aspects as well as the role played by non-state actors. Two attempts have so far failed: the project of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and the JCPOA, which did not take missiles into account. In light of current challenges, GCC countries and the West may have divergent priorities, which must be accounted for. Understanding the logic of the region on nuclear proliferation issues was considered crucial.
Regarding transparency instruments such as the HCoC, it was noted that there might not be any objection to the text in itself yet that it may be difficult to undertake unilateral commitments if potential adversaries do not share the same level of transparency. Major drawbacks to the Code mentioned included the fact that it does not address the issue of drones, does not involve non-state actors, and is not yet signed by Iran.
The discussion allowed participants to point out that efficient regimes would need to be credible, bring transparency in an equal manner, and display an ability to adapt to technological evolutions.
On the HCoC, it was noted that the Code is not an arms control tool but a transparency regime where reciprocity is not necessary. Another part of the discussion focused on the relationship between transparency and secrecy.
The Hague Code of Conduct: a Tool to Limit the risk posed by missiles in the Middle East?
Starting with an overview of the history of HCoC, the fourth session highlighted that 144 states have now subscribed to it, compared to 93 at its adoption in 2002. The Code may be defined as a set of transparency and confidence-building measures, whose subscription is voluntary and open to all states.
It was noted that the current multilateral non-proliferation architecture is in crisis, which makes it all the more important to reinforce the existing instruments that may contribute to reducing tensions. On HCoC specifically, the relevance of the Code was said to have increased as a result of developments in the field of space. The Code however remains a dynamic instrument, which aims to improve itself through work on defining what type of launches must be pre notified in the regime, as well as a better integration with the UNOOSA reporting mechanism. The goal of the HCoC is to be universal and to serve as an anchor to consider future regulations on missiles.
On the practicalities of joining the Code, Austria serves as Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat), and holds Annual Regular Meetings (ARM) for subscribing states.
Subscription to the Code demonstrates a state’s commitment to the international regime of disarmament and the non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. A higher level of commitment is required for states taking up the role of HCoC Chair, however that task is entirely voluntary.
While the Code is a voluntary instrument which thus entails no obligations under international law, subscribing states resolve to undertake the following measures: to nominate a point of contact, to complete an annual declaration, and notify of launches ahead of them happening (pre-launch notifications)
The discussion focused on the role of a universal instrument compared to bilateral mechanisms. It was highlighted that given the frequent rate of notification, the Code constitutes an impressive database on launches worldwide. Its role as an important confidence-building measure was also noted, which is especially relevant on topics related to space.
Missiles and Space Launchers: Evolutions and Revolutions
The fourth session started with a technical reminder of the differences and similarities between rockets, missiles and space launch vehicles. The increased capacity of new generation ballistic missiles was emphasised – such as their accuracy, survivability and affordability, which fuels global demand leading to around 80 types of ballistic missiles that are operational today.
The development of ‘New Space’ raised issues, as new actors enter the field without a full appreciation of potential diversion risks, new manufacturing techniques and the uses and processes that are employed. In this context, the importance of being aware of the dual nature of certain components and technologies transpired.
On the HCoC specifically, it was recalled that the Code requires transparency on ballistic missiles but also on space launch vehicles. There are a number of ways in which the Code deals with space technologies.
First, states are expected to sign or adhere to the three main space security conventions. Second, they are expected to be transparent about their space launch programmes, through pre-launch notifications. States also have the possibility to opt for additional transparency measures, such as inviting international observers to their space launch sites.
The relevance of the Code in the space security field is bound to increase, considering the increasing number of space-faring nations and new technologies. In such a context, it is important to display transparency to show that these activities are not used to advance weapon technologies and promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of space.
The discussion focused on the reporting system of the Code and its inclusion of new technological developments – especially hypersonic missiles and vertical kill vehicles used for ASAT missions.
Patterns of technology transfers were mentioned, in particular the risk of reverse engineering.
Regulating Proliferation while Enabling Space Development
The last session was an opportunity to put the discussion in perspective with ongoing space developments in the Middle East. After introducing some general elements in the field of space, which are leading to a major increase in space assets in orbit, the focus shifted to a more regional perspective.
As such, space developments in the region started in the 1980s, and were dominated by Israel and Arabsat in the following two decades. Since 2019 however, the UAE has been remarkably ambitious in the field. The region now counts 11 space agencies and 5 astronauts from the Middle East have been sent into space.
It was noted that these ambitions would be served by a full implementation of the international agreements and confidence building measures such as HCoC.
To this day, 27 separate international agreements, treaties and resolutions exist and are applicable to space operations. It is however increasingly difficult to negotiate these legally binding agreements, as shown by the deadlock of the Conference on Disarmament.
Other issues addressed by participants included the importance of cooperation in the region despite current difficulties, as well as the possibility of doing regional or bilateral confidence building measures and the importance of interpersonal and military exchanges.
