The international missile non–proliferation regime is in a dire state. The acquisition of missiles and the required technology by more states and non–state groups which did not previously have them—commonly referred to as horizontal proliferation—continues. At the same time, most missile possessor states practice vertical proliferation, which describes the quantitative expansion or modernisation of arsenals and the development of new missile types.1 In particular, the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated missiles by a growing number of states and non–state actors in several regions of the world, as well as the development of new missile technologies and the modernisation of existing stockpiles by major powers, creates uncertainty and fuels regional and international instability. At least 31 states have acquired ballistic missiles, at least 12 possess space launch capabilities and many more supply components and technology towards ballistic missile and space launch programmes.2 Several non–state actors have acquired missiles, as recent uses of missiles in Yemen and against Saudi Arabia have demonstrated.3 Iranian and North Korean missile developments continue despite the imposition of severe sanctions regimes. The demise of the Intermediate–range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—which banned an entire class of missiles—removed restrictions on arsenals of the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation (Russia) and several other Soviet successor states, spurring fears of new military build–ups in Europe and other regions.4 In addition, Russia, the USA, the People’s Republic of China (China) and several other states, including France, are undertaking the development of hypersonic missile technology, creating perceptions of new vulnerabilities.5 These developments increase related potentially destabilising activities, including the use of missiles in ongoing conflicts, the frequency of missile flight ests, a potential widening of the use spectrum of missiles, nuclear and conventional entanglement and the demand for and in turn proliferation of missile technology. In light of these developments and in the absence of a strong norm or treaty banning or regulating all or certain types of missiles, strengthening the existing non–proliferation architecture and its remaining instruments is ever more important.

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Hague Code of Conduct, HCoC), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 are three key non–proliferation instruments that seek to address the challenges posed by missile proliferation. The MTCR and UNSCR 1540 are export control instruments that provide a framework for creating standards and control measures for the trade in missile systems and relevant goods and technologies. They are however often only considered for their roles in enabling technology denial, while their other roles such as creating transparency among supplier states, including on licence denials and detected procurement attempts and diversion, are often neglected. The HCoC is the only multilateral agreement covering missiles open to all states, but it is frequently criticised for its limited scope and effectiveness. By fulfilling its role as a transparency and confidence–building instrument that commits states to responsible conduct and information sharing, it nonetheless seeks to ease tensions and perceptions of insecurity and help states refrain from destabilising arms races. As the only demand–side non–proliferation instrument for missiles, it occupies a key position in the current missile non–proliferation architecture—despite its weaknesses.6

Through their different functions, each of these three instruments serves to address both horizontal and vertical proliferation of ballistic missiles, mainly by strengthening export controls and implementing transparency and confidence–building measures. However, their complementarity remains poorly explored. At a time of severe crisis in traditional arms control approaches, there is a need for more in –depth consideration of these three instruments’ respective contributions to missile non–proliferation.7 This paper therefore explores to what extent HCoC, MTCR, and UNSCR 1540 are complementary in addressing both horizontal and vertical proliferation of ballistic missiles by means of export controls and transparency and confidence–building measures.

The paper mainly focuses on ballistic missiles, rather than on all types of missile systems. A ballistic missile is understood to be an ‘unmanned, actively guided, rocket–propelled vehicle that can be fired […] along a ballistic (or parabolic) trajectory.’8  Ballistic missiles remain the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons and they are also associated with the delivery of chemical and biological weapons. As such, ballistic missile proliferation is intrinsically linked to the threat posed by chemical, biological and nuclear (CBN) weapons to international peace and security. The entanglement of modern conventionally armed ballistic missiles and those carrying CBN weapons—in the absence of arms control agreements creating the necessary transparency, for example through mutual access and inspections—further contributes to crisis instability and increases miscalculation risks.9 The limited ability to defend against ballistic missiles, even for those states with advanced missile defence systems, increases states’ perception of ulnerability, often resulting in potentially destabilising arms build-ups. There is also a ‘dual-use dilemma’ affecting missile technology. Similar technologies are employed both in ballistic missiles and in civilian space launch rockets. States’ right to acquire technology for the latter purpose in order to exercise their rights to the peaceful uses of outer space is explicitly permitted in relevant international treaties. As such, it is more difficult to distinguish legitimate trade and technology transfers from those fuelling a weapons programme. For this reason, the HCoC also seeks to address states’ space launch capabilities and policies. While cruise missiles are associated with some of the same risks as ballistic missiles, they are currently not covered by the HCoC.10 The reasons for this, and the need for an expansion of the coverage of the HCoC to include cruise missiles has been discussed by other authors and is beyond the scope of this paper.11

First, this paper outlines the existing non-proliferation architecture on ballistic missiles by discussing the origins and scope of the HCoC, MTCR and UNSCR 1540. The second part of the paper analyses the roles of the three instruments in seeking to address both horizontal and vertical proliferation of ballistic missiles by means of export controls and transparency and confidence building. It further discusses their complementarity and interactions in fulfilling these roles. Then, it develops recommendations on strengthening the HCoC, MTCR and UNSCR 1540, improving complementarity and enhancing their cooperation. Finally, it briefly draws conclusions on the complementarity of HCoC, MTCR and UNSCR 1540 as tools for ballistic missile non-proliferation. […]

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