Under the current Council Decision, FRS will publish a series of Research Papers on the various aspects of the Code, as well as short Issue Briefs to highlight specific thematic and regional issues, and a major technical study. To find out more, go to our Project Activities
The generalisation of ballistic missiles as conventional weapons, used regularly as an alternative to air strikes, cruise missiles or even drones, conducts to a new reflection on the role of the Code in the current environment.
As a multilateral instrument, the HCoC holds a particular place in a global architecture of measures that attempts to reduce the destabilising nature of ballistic missiles. By promoting transparency about policies and launches, it aims to limit the risk of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and worst-case assessments.
Since its inception and through the collective outreach efforts of its Chairs, the Executive Secretariat, the EU and the United Nations, the Hague Code of Conduct has received growing support. It has improved its efficiency and implementation through a series of initiatives which have made it more easily accessible.
A majority of Northeast Asian states currently possess or seek to acquire ballistic missiles, producing a missile race and an increase in the number of tests as states are developing their capabilities further. Proliferation risks also remain high, and it is noteworthy that only South Korea and Japan have joined the MTCR.
The HCoC holds special significance in the Middle East as the region is fraught with the development of ballistic arsenals, the use of missiles on the battlefield and the proliferation of such systems towards both states and non-state actors. Moreover, several ballistic missile programmes have been closely associated with WMD acquisition.
Only three out of ten Southeast Asian states have joined the HCoC to date (the Philippines, Cambodia and Singapore). This limited rate is noteworthy as Southeast Asia is increasingly concerned by the ongoing ballistic missile competition in broader Asia. Moreover, the region is actively investing to benefit from space technologies.
The New Space trend – an ongoing innovative transformation of the space sector – has led to a rise of investment in small launch systems. While an increasing number of nations are gaining access to space, the number of private sector entities investing in this domain is also rising. Meanwhile, small space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles rely on increasingly similar technologies.
The proliferation of WMD and of conventional weapons are, in many ways, separate threats with different levels of impact and proliferation dynamics. However, there are linkages between WMD and conventional weapons proliferation. Notably, the same factors increase the risk of both threats, including geographic vulnerabilities.
Caribbean states have regularly joined the HCoC since its adoption in 2002, showing a steady interest in the Code. But despite this, the current level of subscription remains low, with half of the 16 Caribbean states having signed it.
Latin America is one of the regions with the highest level of support for the HCoC. This support reflects the historic commitment of the region in favour of disarmament and non-proliferation. The remaining four non-subscribing states – Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico – have voiced concerns about the adoption of the Code outside the United Nations framework and its limited scope.
India’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missiles are mostly designed as delivery vehicles for their nuclear weapons. While intrinsically linked to their national security, ballistic missiles also have regional security implications for South Asia. Non-proliferation and arms control efforts have so far been aimed at the bilateral level. Subscription to other instruments including the HCoC remains low in the region, although India joined the HCoC in 2016.
While both ballistic programmes and the risk posed by these systems remain very limited on the African continent, ballistic missiles inherently constitute a global risk – due to their range and destructive potential. Instruments such as the HCoC, which seek to limit the proliferation of such systems, are therefore relevant for African countries.
The Hague Code of Conduct focuses on ballistic missiles as they remain the preferred delivery vehicle for WMDs. The HCoC therefore regulates one of the most dangerous types of weapons in existence.
The HCoC was adopted in 2002, at a time where the international community pushed strongly for the adoption of norms to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. It was initially designed as a first step which would lead to further regulations in the field. However, rising international tensions have prevented states from engaging beyond the 2002 compromise.
Around 30 states hold ballistic missiles today. All current nuclear-weapon possessor states have acquired missile production capacities to enhance their nuclear deterrence.
The project is funded
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