Dealing with Missile proliferation: security and arms control perspectives
22-23 June 2023
Abuja, Nigeria
A regional seminar for African countries was held on 22-23 June 2023. More than 100 participants representing a dozen of regional countries discussed over ballistic missile proliferation in the region and the role of the Hague Code of Conduct. This event was co-organised with the Federal Government of Nigeria, which was Chair of the HCoC for 2022-2023.
AGENDA
DAY 1
INTRODUCTION
- Samson Itegboje, Director, Planning, Research & Statistics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
- Dr Halilu Shaba Ahmad, Director General, National Space Research and Development Agency, Nigeria
- Mr Ruben Alba Aguilera, Acting Head of Cooperation of the Delegation of the European Union in Nigeria
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
I/ Challenges linked to the proliferation of missiles: global and African perspectives
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
- Ms Djenabou Cisse, Research Fellow, FRS
- Mr Hubert Foy, Director, AFRICSIS
- Ms Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow, FRS
- Missile proliferation: main trends and consequences for international security
- Technology evolutions and prospects
- The situation in Africa
- What regulatory frameworks?
II/ National perspectives on the HCoC
MODERATOR:
Mr William Agblonon, Policy Advisor, UNREC
- Mr Patricio Mbarga Mba Mendua, Legal Officer, Ministry of External Affairs and international Cooperation, Equatorial Guinea
III/ The Hague Code of Conduct: genesis, functioning and role
- Ms Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow, FRS
- Amb. Suleiman Dauda Umar, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the International Organisations in Vienna, Nigeria, HCoC Chair, 2022-2023
- Ms Lioba Bammer, Representative of the HCoC Executive Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austria
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
KEY ISSUES:
- History and justification behind the adoption of the Code
- Functioning of HCoC
- Benefits of subscribing
- The HCoC in Africa
- Dynamics and perspectives for the Code
IV/ Breakout sessions, for subscribing states and non-subscribing states, plenary debrief and close-out
DAY 2
V/ Implementing non-proliferation to promote regional development
- Ms Emmanuelle Maitre, Research Fellow, FRS
PANELLISTS:
- Mr William Agblonon, Policy Advisor, UNREC
- Mr Kudakwashe Mapako, Research officer, AFRICSIS
- Ms Gugu Dube, Independent Expert
KEY ISSUES:
- Integration of missiles within the global non-proliferation and arms control architecture
- Shared priorities regarding strategic trade management
- The role of initiatives such as the 1540 Resolution
- Links between non-proliferation and development
VI/ Transparency measures and the promotion of space development in Africa
MODERATOR:
- Ms Djenabou Cisse, Research Fellow, FRS
- Mr Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General, FRS
- Ms Nelly-Helen Ebruka, National point of contact, Space Generation Advisory Council
- Dr Olufemi Agboola, Director of Department of Engineering and Space Systems, National Space Research and Development Agency, Nigeria
- Sikiru Onipe Abdulraheem, Assistant Director, R&D, Defence Space Administration, Nigeria
KEY ISSUES:
- The role of the export control mechanisms and UN multilateral initiatives
- New space and proliferation concerns
- Favouring space development while regulating strategic trade
- Perspective for space development in Africa
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The seminar was mentioned on Nigerian national television and in the press:
“30 countries participate in ballistic weapons conference in Nigeria,” TVC News, 22 June 2023.
“Nigeria Hosts African Seminar On Proliferation Of Ballistic Missiles,” The Will, 22 June 2023
Nigeria to Host African Seminar on The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in Abuja, NTA, 22 June 2023
Summary of the debates
Introduction
The seminar was opened officially by Amb. Samson Itegboje, Director, Planning, Research & Statistics, of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He highlighted the role of Nigeria as Chair of the Hague Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles (HCoC), recalled the principles of the Code and explained how it fitted with the priorities of Nigeria in terms of peace and security. He insisted on the pertinence of the HCoC in a context where the threat posed by ballistic missiles is rising, and noted that this instrument is widely supported on the international stage.
Dr Halilu Shaba Ahmad, Director General of the National Space Research and Development Agency (NSRDA), then mentioned the role of the Agency in promoting development and providing solutions to the challenges of the country through space exploration. He mentioned that Nigeria is a space-faring nation with six satellites in space, and is ambitioning to develop an autonomous launching capacity. This development of space launchers is strictly for peaceful purposes and is accompanied by international cooperation, involvement in international space forums such as the COPUOS and respect of the international law related to space.
Mr Ruben Alba Aguilera, Acting Head of Cooperation of the Delegation of the European Union in Nigeria recalled the role of the European Union (EU) in promoting the universalisation of the HCoC. He noted its wide support, through its membership and support in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. He focused on the special support of African states to the Code, demonstrated by the fact that some of the most recent signatories are coming from the continent (Togo in 2019, Equatorial Guinea and Somalia in 2020). He noted the importance of multilateralism and cooperation to tackle global challenges such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
Finally, Alexandre Houdayer, Secretary General of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), explained the scope of the work conducted by FRS to create a forum in which the issues linked to ballistic missiles can be discussed and the HCoC in particular can be addressed by subscribing and non-subscribing states.
Challenges linked to the proliferation of missiles: global and African perspectives
The first panel aimed at presented why missile proliferation is a matter of worry globally and why it concerns Africa in particular.
At first sight, missile proliferation may seem a remote problem for African countries. Very few countries on the continent have had experience with these weapons. Nonetheless, if WMD-capable missile proliferation is a minor problem to this day in Africa, it could become an issue in the future. The first speaker emphasised the deterioration of the security environment on the continent. The collapse of the Libyan state, in particular, led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters in the region, fuelling violent extremism and instability, in particular in the Sahel. Mercenary groups and foreign militias are also active on the continent. This leads many countries to significantly increase their military spending and to try to acquire new military capabilities. Different states turn to different international partners, in the United States, in Europe, but also increasingly in Russia and China, with for instance a strong trend of drone acquisition from Beijing. A number of countries are now operating combat drones that are being used for instance in counter-insurgency or anti-terrorist operations. Surface-to-air missiles are also operated on the continent, including by non-state organisations like Wagner. Arms capabilities are therefore evolving quickly on the continent, which highlights the necessity of regulating arms proliferation. In this context, the democratization of some technological advances, the rise of non-state actors and arms trafficking suggest that these technologies could be more present on the continent in the future.
The second presentation started by highlighting the main characteristics of ballistic missiles, explaining the differences between the kinds of systems, from tactical to strategic, and their ranges. The main features of ballistic trajectory and the principle of rocket propulsion were explained. Missiles also depend on a guidance system that allows them to hit their target accurately, and a payload, which can be nuclear, conventional, or chemical/biological. Referring to ballistic proliferation points to two phenomena: first, the fact that new states and non-state actors are acquiring these weapons, and second, vertical proliferation, by which countries that already have missiles expand their inventory by developing new systems. Today, more than 30 countries possess ballistic missiles, very few of them in Africa. South Africa developed a ballistic missile programme but abandoned it when it renounced its nuclear programme at the end of the Apartheid. Libya promised to destroy its arsenal in 2003. Egypt still operates short-range ballistic missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Satellite imagery showed very recently that these missiles could be stored in the vicinity of Cairo. The risks associated to missile proliferation include increasing regional instability, heightening the potential for arms race, disrupting the strategic balance and increasing the chance of conflict. For these reasons, the international community has engaged in non-proliferation and arms control efforts on these particular systems. Moreover, ballistic missiles are strongly connected to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through several dynamics. This has consequences for African states, as it can impact regional stability, development, peacekeeping operations and has obvious humanitarian consequences. Collaborative efforts to limit those risks are in line with the policies of a majority of African states, which have a strong interest in collective measures aiming at enhancing global security, preventing the use of weapons and fostering regional security.
The last presenter explained why the international community has tried since the 1990s to regulate missile proliferation. Three main factors make these weapons particularly destabilising. First, ballistic missile tests can be misinterpreted for missile attacks and led to involuntary escalation. Second, ballistic missiles have been systematically developed by countries aiming to acquire WMDs. Thus, they transform a theoretical WMD threat into an actual one as they allow an actor to carry the threat posed by WMD to the territory of another party. Third, even as conventional weapons, they can be used as terror weapons by targeting heavy populated areas. They are hard to intercept and have a strong psychological impact, as seen in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war, and more recently the conflict in Yemen, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For these reasons, regulation has been attempted over the year. A simple prohibition was impossible to defend politically. Major powers, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union and later Russia have adopted arms control measures that have led to strong diminutions of missile arsenals. The G7 nations have created in 1987 an export control regime, the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) to prevent the spread of missile technologies. This regime has now 35 countries that agree not to transfer delivery vehicles that can carry WMDs to other countries. At the United Nations, resolutions have been adopted to prevent some actors from developing or acquiring ballistic missiles. This is the case of non-state actors, through the 1540 Resolution, and for countries such as Iran and North Korea. Finally, confidence-building measures have been adopted bilaterally and multilaterally. Nonetheless, missile proliferation remains a challenge. Historic missile producers develop their arsenals with new technologies such as hypersonic gliders. Some state and non-state actors rely on clandestine channels to obtain strike systems. Finally, new countries are producing or buying conventional ballistic missiles, in particular from the United States and Russia. These trends have led to a strong increase in the use of ballistic missiles in recent years.
The Hague Code of Conduct: genesis, functioning and role
The following panel presented the Code more specifically. The first speaker emphasised the relevance for an African country such as Nigeria to promote an instrument such as the Code. Indeed, it is in line with the objective of promoting transparency in security matters. Second, it is a chance to obtain knowledge and information on weapon developments that would be hard to collect elsewhere. While African countries have many priorities and often limited resources to address all security challenges, it is noticeable that participation in an instrument such as the Code entails very limited resources. The HCoC is a technically oriented organisation that has a political undertone which makes it binding on those states that sing it. It aims at strengthening the existing national and international security arrangements, disarmament, and non-proliferation related matters. The purpose of the Code as of today has been politicized because of the current and emerging issues in the international system. It is therefore necessary for parties to uphold the tenets of the Code by playing according to the rules, cooperate, and implement the Code for the common benefits of humankind. In addition, the subscribing states should be encouraged to establish confidence-building measures in all their dealings relating to the implementation of the Code. Concerning African countries, they are looking at the conduct of the major players as regard transparency, cooperation, and openness before they can fully participate.
The second panellist started by giving a rapid overview of the HCoC’s inception and history, noting that 143 states have subscribed to this date against 93 at its adoption. Adopted in 2002, the HCoC is a set of transparency and confidence-building measures. Subscription to it is voluntary and open to all States. It prohibits neither the possession of ballistic missiles nor the development of space activities for peaceful ends. It is not legally binding. Signatory States commit themselves to joining a number of international texts on space issues and to filing annual declarations and pre-launch notifications in the domain of missiles and space vehicles. While the Code forbids neither the possession of ballistic missiles nor the development of space activities for peaceful ends, it asks states to ‘exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction’. The African continent has a good rate of subscription to the Code, with 42 subscribing states. Different regions are more or less represented within the HCoC, with a higher rate of subscription in West Africa, and less subscribing states in Southern Africa. Precisions were given on what the Code is and is not. The various UNGA resolutions in support of the Code were also mentioned, and it was noticed that the number of States supporting these resolutions has been increasing since 2008. The latest resolution adopted by the UNGA in 2022 (A/RES/77/58) received 167 votes in favour, the number of abstentions continuing to decline. While the voluntary nature of the Code was mentioned, as well as some of its limitations and shortcomings, its relevance in the current context was also reassessed.
Lastly, the third panellist developed the practicalities of joining the Code. Austria serves as Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat) of the HCoC, and holds Annual Regular Meetings (ARM) for subscribing states. Subscription to the Code demonstrates a state’s commitment to the international regime of disarmament and the non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. It enables privileged information exchange thereby enhancing trust-building and offers a platform to address issues linked to implementation and the broader dialogue on peace and security. It is also free of charge. A higher level of commitment is required on the part of a state taking the role of HCoC Chair, but that task is entirely voluntary. While the Code is a voluntary instrument therefore entailing no obligations under international law, subscribing states resolve to undertake the following measures: to nominate a point of contact (who has access to the online platform), to complete an annual declaration (a copy of which was shared with the participants) and pre-launch notifications (PLN) in case of a launch. Declarations are now submitted online, thereby easing the process. Concerning PLN, there is no specific format but they usually include information about the class of object launched, as well as the date, time and duration of launch, the launching area and the planned direction. Similarly, PLN can be uploaded on the website by points of contact. After presenting the two parts of the hcoc.at website (restricted and public), and the role of the ARM (the most recent having taken place on 15 June 2023, during which the Chairmanship was transferred from Nigeria to Ireland), the panellist described precisely how a state can subscribe to the Code: subscription is a unilateral act, consisting in a communication directed to the Austrian Executive Secretariat, which in turn notifies all subscribing states.
Implementing non-proliferation to promote regional development
The first presentation developed the different tools that exist in Africa to deal with non-proliferation and disarmament. In introduction, it was noted that the continent had been especially vulnerable to weapon proliferation and circulation because of the fragility of decolonized states, the effects of the Cold War, the persistence of conflicts, and political instability. Many approaches have therefore been pursued on the continent regarding arms control. Regional organisations have been active on this front, in particular to promote treaty adherence, on WMDs and small arms and light weapons. Other initiatives have concerned disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and peacekeeping and conflict prevention. International assistance can contribute to enhancing capacity building. These various elements create a machinery which allow to promote non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control through various lenses. Regarding WMDs, beyond treaty adherence, several elements are important to favour efficient implementation, in particular disarmament and non-proliferation education, United Nations support, regional cooperation and international cooperation and assistance. The main instruments on the continent are the Pelindaba Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-free zone in Africa, the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW), the biological and the chemical weapons conventions, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, the Kinshasa Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons, but also the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the HCoC. Challenges to implementation include the persistence of illicit arms proliferation, conflicts and instability that feeds the demand for arms and create cross-border challenges, weak governance and corruption, insufficient legislative and institutional frameworks. African states also suffer from limited technological capacities, lack of resources, and limited international support. These challenges must be tackled to allow African states to play their role in the peace and security global framework, enhance their ability to prevent crises and conflicts and enjoy sustainable development.
The second speaker assessed the relevance of the HCoC with other African priorities regarding non-proliferation and disarmament. Africa has been consistent with its non-proliferation and disarmament status in pursuit of a comprehensive international security regime. At the global level, African States as members to critical non-proliferation and disarmament legal instruments have a legal obligation to prioritise and promote non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Moreover, the increasing geopolitical tensions have made it apparent that a nuclear war is not too far-fetched. More pragmatically, the extraction of uranium across the continent; efforts to integrate nuclear into the energy mix by African States; and the overall consensus that WMD pose a universal threat solidifies African States’ indubitable duty to prioritise non-proliferation and disarmament. Concerning uranium mining, a growing number of countries are involved in this activity on the continent, but gaps in security capacities aiming at protecting nuclear material and nuclear facilities. While African states are active in supporting disarmament and non-proliferation, and are usually supporting of multilateral instruments in this domain, they can lack the resources or awareness at the political level to fully take part in these regimes or implement them. It is therefore necessary to synthesise information so that it can appear relevant to political leaders, including in national Parliaments. Second, African States have the possibility to use regional and international multilateralism as a mechanism to ensure capacity-building efforts in an inclusive manner. Apart from just ratification and domestication of the legal instruments, African States need to value the benefits of complementarity offered by legal instruments to promote non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Considering that Africa is a key stakeholder, a responsibility is bestowed upon African States to prioritise the promotion of nuclear related facilities protection, multilateralism and capacity building, complementarity of nuclear security vis-à-vis evolving threats that impede on non-proliferation disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear material in particular. A holistic approach is needed to ensure non-proliferation and disarmament by African States as a united front.
The last presenter emphasised the links between non-proliferation and development and the linkage between small arms and light weapons proliferation, which is a key priority on the continent, as it fuels wars and insecurity and poses a threat to democratic stability in many countries of the region, and WMD proliferation. In particular, while factors of acquisition may differ, methods of acquisitions and vulnerabilities may be comparable. While WMD proliferation may appear abstract in Africa, it may depend on the same types of vulnerabilities, in particular linked to geographical vulnerabilities and lack of border control capacities. Some tools can contribute to reducing both risks, from better control management to transparency. Efforts to increase non-proliferation capacities can clearly be used to limit the spread of small arms. WMD non-proliferation is therefore in line with other priorities of the region, as seen by the regional commitment not to develop nuclear weapons expressed in the Pelindaba Treaty. There is therefore an interest in increasing regional participation in various instruments and in particular in the Code. The African Union could engage on this issue and in particular weigh in favour of a positive vote for UNGA resolutions supporting the Code. States should integrate the Code in their non-proliferation and disarmament strategies, but also in their space policies. Because the Code mentions the issue of the peaceful use of space, it contributes indirectly to the UN sustainable development goals and to supporting a better access to resources.
Transparency measures and the promotin of space development in Africa
The HCoC requires transparency on ballistic missiles but also on space launch vehicles. Indeed, technologies used for both types of rockets are similar in many ways. The first presenter focused on how the Code deals with space technologies. First, states are expected to sign or adhere to the three main space security conventions. Second, they are expected to provide transparency on their space launch programmes, in particular through the pre-launch notifications. States have also the possibility to opt for additional transparency measures, in particular to invite international observers to their space launch sites. This measure has been implemented by Norway, Japan, and France twice. Lately, in December 2022, FRS with the support of the EU organised a visit of the Kourou space launch site in which participated a dozen of invited representatives. These measures in no way aim at excluding states from reaping the benefits from space, which is fully recognised in the text of the Code. The relevance of the Code in the space area is bound to increase. The number of space-faring nations is growing, and new technologies, in particular small satellites, mean that new countries are going to be interested in developing their own launching vehicles. In this context, it is all the more important to display transparency to show that these activities are not used to advance weapon technologies and promote international cooperation on the peaceful use of space.
In the following presentation, it was shown that African states have a huge stake in investing in space technologies and benefit from space for development. Key technologies in space include earth observation, remote sensing, and global navigation. They can be used for weather and climate monitoring, disaster managing, internet services, agriculture monitoring, telemedicine, security or education. Despite these obvious benefits, the involvement of African nations in space has been limited to this day, hampered by a lack of political will, inadequate financial capability to invest in costly technology, and inadequate organisational culture and motivation in the space sector. Dedicated government leaders, greater public awareness and transparency can help promote space development in a responsible and peaceful manner. International cooperation is crucial, and must be combined to increased capacity building and efforts to favour space entrepreneurship in the private sector.
The last two speakers focused on the case of Nigeria. First, the importance of subscribing to norms such as the HCoC in order to demonstrate the intent to be a peaceful user of space was mentioned. Responsible actors are required to notify their activities and especially the launch of satellites, in particular to the COPUOS (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) and the ITU (International Telecommunication Union). Participating in multilateral mechanisms is especially important for latecomers to space, as transparency is required to enter this particular field and as information and international communication are crucial. Assistance and knowledge dissemination can only take place if there is no doubt about the potential diversion of technologies toward military use. African nations are designing the tools to be more influential in space, with the creation of a number of space agencies, in South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Angola, Morocco or Ghana. For these countries, several factors are essential. First, because of the proximity between launchers and ballistic missiles, there is an interest in being transparent and closing pathways to weapon proliferation. But this must not prevent access to foreign technologies, which has been essential for instance in the development of the Indian space industry. Cooperation is key to decreasing costs and allowing the development of performant systems. This is paramount in order to fill the Nigerian ambitions in the field of space, which include training an astronaut to go to space, manufacturing satellites in Nigeria, producing an indigenous launch vehicle and building a launch site in Nigeria.
The last speaker concurred that transparency is key to attract collaborations, investments and to drive technology acquisition. As such, countries need to be aware of export control mechanisms. This is all the more important as the field of space is being increasingly contested with global challenges that need to be tackled, such as the development and fielding of anti-satellite weapons, the problem of space debris, the issue of dual-use technologies and cyber risk in space with the possibility to see actors attempting to manipulate satellites for their own purposes. In addition to international collaboration, governance and multilateral commitment are required to solve these issues. In Africa, this must be done with the goal of bridging the digital divide and overcome infrastructural challenges. New small satellite constellations offer a chance to bring inclusiveness to the use of telecommunications and in particular to the Internet. Access to space is also critical in managing natural disaster response and building resilience in the field of security.
